## 1AC

**Plan: The United States Federal government should place a statutory restriction on the presidential power of indefinite detention.**

**The US response to terrorism has resulted in an autoimmune crisis, exemplified by increasing indefinite detention of citizens, permanent residents, and foreigners. This treatment poses the greatest threat to the US and abroad by undermining the morals we claim to protect.**  
**Addis 7**(Boston University Law Review, Vol 87:323 <http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/volume87n2/documents/ADDISv.2.pdf>)

In the same way that the physical body has clearly demarcated boundaries, **¶ the body politic** also **has defined territorial and institutional boundaries**. A ¶ political community is **defined** not only **by the territory it occupies and the ¶ people that inhabit it, but also by the institutions and norms that organize it.**74¶ When **terrorists** attack, they wish **to target not only infrastructure and people, ¶ but also the institutions and norms** that they believe organize and shape that ¶ particular political community.75 Indeed, in some circumstances they ¶ announce that to be their objective.76 The leaders of the target countries often ¶ claim this to be the terrorists’ objective as well.77 Ironically, though, **when a government responds** to this outside **invader in the way the United States has, ¶ such a response more than anything else threatens the integrity and health of** ¶ **the body politic. The result is** similar to **an autoimmunity crisis.**¶ There are five distinct ways in which the war on terror may be leading to the ¶ injury of the very community (body politic) that the war is supposed to protect ¶ from terrorist threat. **First**, at the most basic level**, the war on terror has** ¶ **continually undermined the institutions that define who we are. Practices such** ¶ **as prolonged detentions without trial or access to family and lawye**rs,78 the ¶ **establishment of secret detention centers**,79 the use of rendition to outsource ¶,80 and even the use ¶ of highly questionable **torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment of detainees** tactics against prisoners for information gathering have ¶ done just that.81 As Lord Hoffmann noted in a concurring opinion in A v. ¶ Secretary of State for the Home Department, **“The real threat . . . comes not from terrorism but from [practices] such as these.”82 In the process of** ¶ **undermining the institutions and processes that define us, the war on terror** ¶ **threatens to collapse the distinction between “us” and “them.”** **Our tactics** ¶ **increasingly become similar to tactics used by those we define as the Other**.83¶ Second, **the institutions that the war on terror has continually undermined in** ¶ **the guise of fighting terrorism make up the very fabric of our defense structure**. ¶ Take, for example, the self-defense principle discussed above.84 Undermining ¶ this principle in the name of effectively fighting terrorist threats will lead to an unstable world, a detriment to the global interests of the United States. With ¶ America’s unprecedented status as a world power comes unparalleled exposure ¶ to such threats and attacks. The administration’s doctrine of preventive war ¶ may provide analogous support for other states to act out their own paranoia or ¶ imperial ambition.85 Not only will this policy likely encourage other states to ¶ invoke self-defense to intervene in the internal affairs of others,86 it may even ¶ encourage terrorists to provide similar justifications. Rather than achieving ¶ total victory, **the war on terror is simply recycling and endlessly circulating the** ¶ **violence by engaging in repressive actions.**87 Also, noncompliance by the ¶ United States with the dictates of international institutions and processes, either ¶ in relation to the laws of war or human rights, has provided justification for ¶ other countries to flout aspects of international norms and processes.88¶

**-Autoimmunity permeates all public policy. The need to securitize internationally becomes the need to securitize all of humanity in the name of a controllable future. This manipulation of temporal politics allows torture, dehumanization, and genocide to become acceptable practices of the present.**

**Stockdale 10** (Liam, P.D., Ph.D. in International Relations, Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2010/Stockdale.pdf>)

While the idea of **pre-emption with regard to discourses of security is perhaps most¶ often associated with the so-called Bush Doctrine** in US foreign policymaking0—most clearly¶ exemplified, of course, by the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Ehrenberg et al. 2010, C. Weber¶ 2007)—it must also be stressed that the notion of taking explicit action in the present to preempt potential irruptions of “danger” in the future—what might be termed the logic of preemption—**is far from limited in its deployment to the realm of interstate security relations¶ alone.** Indeed, as criminologist Richard Ericson asserts, **the logic of pre-emption can be seen¶ to permeate all aspects of the exercise of sovereign power in the current moment**, to the point¶ where **the contemporary security environment might be best termed a “state of pre-emption”**¶ (Ericson 2008: 58). Under such conditions, “security” is conceived in terms of **safeguarding¶ the future from what may occur** by undertaking precautionary measures in the present that are¶ conceived in relation to an imagined future. Security is thus **pursued by attempting to “police¶ the future by anticipation,” with the ultimate goal being the realization of an imagined “future¶ perfect” where the “risks” against which these present exceptional practices are deployed will¶ no longer be of concern (**Bigo 2007: 31).¶ Accordingly, **the logic of pre-emption is innately concerned with exerting control over**¶ **the temporal dimension of human existence.** **Sovereign power deployed in pursuit of the logic¶ of pre-emption is thus active in both the spatial and temporal realms, as it attempts to¶ manipulate and control the relationship between present and future through “calculations**¶ about probable futures in the present [the temporal element], followed by interventions into¶ the present in order to control that potential future [the spatial element]” (Aradau et al. 2008:¶ 149). The crucial point is that **a security climate premised upon the logic of pre-emption is¶ concerned primarily with safeguarding the future, while the present is constructed in ¶ instrumental terms as a site of intervention** through which this ultimate aim might be realized.¶ As such, to use the terminology of the Copenhagen School, under the logic of pre-emption,¶ the future is securitized (Buzan et al. 1998). **The result is that the proverbial door is opened ¶ for the deployment of exceptional practices “beyond the realm of normal politics” in the¶ present,** since the logic of pre-emption holds that it is through proactive/preemptive/precautionary measures enacted in the present that the security of the future can be¶ ensured.Yet the inherent unknowability of the future ensures that pre-emptive pursuits are¶ necessarily plagued by an information deficit, thus **generating “an insatiable quest for¶ knowledge**” on the part of sovereign authorities pursuing information **related to potential¶ future dangers** (Aradau & Van Munster 2007: 91). Regardless of the success of such efforts,¶ however, the idea of pre-emptive security is perpetually imbued with an innate level of¶ uncertainty precisely because the future cannot be known for certain, no matter how detailed¶ and precise and rigorous the collected data and subsequent risk calculations might be (de¶ Goede 2008). **This leads the imperatives of pre-emptive security to merge with a politics of¶ risk management** premised upon the so-called “precautionary principle,” **whereby sovereign ¶ decisions** relating to appropriate pre-emptive action to be undertaken **are made solely on the¶ basis of unsubstantiated suspicion** or highly arbitrary **(and often highly racialized) calculations**¶ regarding the likelihood of a future irruption of threat (Aradau & Van Munster 2007: 102).¶ Accordingly, **the** pre-emptive **practices of sovereign power take on a highly biopolitical¶ character, as governmental intrusions into the everyday lives of individual subjects become an¶ crucial component of the pursuit of security**. The securitization of the future thus necessitates¶ the deployment of an extensive array of governmental technologies—from conventional¶ military intervention, to indefinite detention, to pervasive surveillance and biometric¶ monitoring—in pursuit of information that might be relevant to preventing an irruption of¶ danger that may occur in at some indefinite point in the unknown future (Ibid. 105). Aradau ¶ and Van Munster (2007: 97), invoking Foucault, aptly refer to these practices collectively as a¶ precautionary “dispositif of risk,” capturing both the variety of techniques employed and the¶ ultimately unified objective of securing an imagined future that underwrites their enaction.

#### The racism inherent in US justification of indefinite detention- abducting people from around the world and within US borders based on sharing characteristics we’ve been taught to associate with danger and instability- spills over to domestic policies as well. The desire for a “sterile” nation informs our relationship with the local “Other,” suppressing the voices of minorities, women, and countless other identities.

**Johnson 10’** (Andrew, Lecturer at Open University, The Pathology of Politics: Derrida’s reading of Auto-immunity and Carl Schmitt 09/12/10)

**Auto-immunity** is a concept that **seeks to undermine** this **dependence upon the self** in political philosophy. Take the example of **democracy**: In its constitutive autoimmunity, **in its vocation of hospitality** (with everything in the¶ ipse¶ that works over the etymology and experience of the¶ hospes¶ through the aporias of hospitality), democracy **has always wanted** by turns and at the same time **two incompatible things**: it has wanted, on the one hand, **to welcome only men,** and on the condition that they be citizens, brothers, and compeers, **excluding all the others**, in particular bad citizens, rogues, noncitizens, and all sorts of unlike and unrecognizable others, **and**, on the other hand, at the same time or by turns, it has wanted **to open itself up, to offer hospitality, to all those excluded.** In both cases, let us recall, and here is a problem I take up elsewhere, this **hospitality remains limited and conditional**. But even in this restricted space it **is typical for the democracy to do one or the other**, sometimes one and the other, sometime both at the same time and/or by turns**. Rogues or degenerates are sometimes brothers**, citizens, compeers (Rogues, p. 63).2¶ **Derrida locates within democracy a “¶ constitutive autoimmunity ,” that seeks to immunize itself against threats and at the same moment remain open to excluded populations. Thus its constitutive logic is at heart paradoxical. Democracy, by definition, is exemplar of the essential¶ aporia¶ of auto-immunity: by its constitution, it is unable to recognize its mode of protection from its open hospitality to the other. Derrida’s use of auto-immunity becomes political, insofar as it describes the defense mechanisms put into place by a state to protect itself from what is outside and foreign. Immunity, auto-immunity, both biological and political, is an entire way of thinking of security, of borders, of protection schemes, but also, inversely, the means and extent of one’s hospitality. Auto-immunity, as a political concept, describes the immune system of the nation-state itself. Whereas democracy is threatened by its own mode of security/immunity, it has the audacity to hope for an unconditional hospitality that might create an ethically imperative politics.**

**We control the scale of violence – structural violence is necessary to psychologically prime people for macro-level conflict**

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4**

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)

(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). **Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities.** More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. **The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder**. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, **it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times**. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and **there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes**, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), **constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides”** to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. **These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite.** As Wittgenstein observed**, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted**. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. **Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war**. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. **The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent?** What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end **it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible** (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. **Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency**” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” **Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment.** Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence**. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide.** But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. **Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations.** It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting **that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified**. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. **They harbor the** early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the **“priming”** (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) **that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life** and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

**Without rupturing that logic through complete hospitality towards the other and the inclusion of different kinds of voices, a global nuclear disaster is inevitable.**

**Anthony ‘95**

Carl Anthony is the Executive Director of the Urban Habitat Program and the chair of the East Bay Conversion Reinvestment Commission Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Freedom from Annihilation Is a Human Right Spring Summer 1995 <http://urbanhabitat.org/node/945> \*language modified

**Nuclear weapons are tools of a conquering, violent culture. Racism at domestic** and international **levels heightens the potential vulnerability and miscalculation surrounding nuclear proliferation**. **Few people of color have had any role in debate, development, or decision-making about the goals of this brutal technology. In a nuclear ~~holocaust~~ [war] whole populations will be vaporized** in the flash of an eye. **People deciding the appropriateness of such a choice inevitably would bring their prejudices and fears to the** devastating **decision** to annihilate whole peoples. **The concentration of nuclear power in the hands of a Eurocentric technological elite, paranoid about the aims and aspirations of the majority of the world's population—people of color—magnifies the potential for global disaster**. **The great and growing gulf of human communication between the rich and poor**, European and non-European, **multiplies the potential antagonism that could result in planetary holocaust.** In this context **organizing against nuclear proliferation is, by definition, a multicultural effort,** **bringing the intelligence and wisdom of every community to the global task of defeating the excesses of racism, human aggression, and technology-gone-berserk.**

**In pursuit of so-called terrorists, the US have reduced its foreign policy tactics to the Precautionary Principle- striking any would-be threat and using war as our primary means of communication with the middle east. This has resulted in the transfer of power to the Military Industrial Complex and the few elites who control it.**

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The war on terror is radically recasting the notion of preemptive self-defense from that of an emergency measure designed to allow a state to respond to an imminent threat, to one by which a state (in this case **the United States) plays the role of guarantor of international peace and security,** a role the Charter ¶ explicitly allocates to the Security Council.54 The reallocation of war-making ¶ power is being effected without an amendment to the Charter. There is no ¶ dispute **that in the era of weapons of mass destruction the international ¶ community must be proactive, not merely reactive, in the maintenance of ¶ global peace and security**. The debate lies in who should authorize such action ¶ and whether the self-defense principle should be transformed into a means by ¶ which each state plays the role of the guarantor of international peace and ¶ security. The Bush doctrine of preventive war threatens to lead to the reallocation of ¶ international war-making power. As part of a new National Security Strategy ¶ and the war on terror, **the Bush administration** has **called for preventive attacks ¶ on so-called “rogue states”** who may be potential enemies, **even though their ¶ intentions** and their capacity **to threaten the United States were not yet clear**.55¶ **The rationale** for the policy is that living in an age of terrorism, where an ¶ attack could come at any time and from anywhere, **requires the United States ¶ to defend itself by attacking rogue state**s that give shelter to terrorist groups ¶ and those who seek to develop weapons of mass destruction which may end up ¶ in terrorist hands. The plan is **to deprive terrorists of hiding places and rogue ¶ states of the capacity to inflict great damage on the United States in the ¶ future**.56 Some commentators have likened this policy of preventive attack to ¶ **the** well-known “**Precautionary Principle**” employed in the health and ¶ environmental fields, which **states that lack of scientific certainty should not forestall an action that might prevent serious or irreversible harm**.57 This ¶ comparison is borne out by the following passage in the National Security ¶ Strategy:¶ We cannot let our enemies strike first. . . . **The greater the threat, the ¶ greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for ¶ taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains** ¶ as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent ¶ such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, ¶ act preemptively.58 The invasion of Iraq was at one time justified as a preventive action,59 and the ¶ U.S. administration has not precluded the possibility that Iran could also be a ¶ target of that policy.¶ **The** Bush preventive (precautionary) **doctrine not only dispenses with the ¶ requirement of imminence, but also shifts the burden to the target states to ¶ demonstrate that they do not harbor terrorists or WMDs, and are not in the ¶ process of developing WMDs**.60 The notion of **preventive self-defense** that the ¶ Bush administration has put forward **therefore undermines the idea that self defense is an emergency measure designed to deal with imminent threats**. ¶ Further, **this** version of self-defense **undermines the notion that those who ¶ claim there is a threat have the burden of demonstrating that a risk exists** and ¶ that it cannot be prevented by any other means. The report of the High-Level ¶ Panel, established by the Secretary-General to advise him on the major issues facing the U.N. and the world, cautions that **such** preventive military action ¶ **will transform the allocation of war-making power**. Additionally, the report ¶ states that “in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global ¶ order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is ¶ simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action . . . to be ¶ accepted.”61 Under the doctrine of preventive war, **a war-making measure that ¶ was devised to deal with emergencies becomes part of the arsenal of ordinary ¶ foreign policy strategies.** This, of course, takes us back to the pre-WWII ¶ paradigm that the United Nations regime was meant to have abolished.¶ The notion of preventive attack that the Bush administration has adopted as ¶ an official policy is **premised on the idea that the United States has been ¶ engaged in a war since at least September 11.** Winning the war under this ¶ policy requires preventive attacks that will impair the capacities of not only ¶ known enemies but also potential enemies, preventing both known and ¶ potential risks. Conceptualizing the struggle against terrorism as a war and ¶ viewing preventive attacks as necessary to successfully prosecute the war turns ¶ the measure that was developed to respond to emergencies into an ordinary ¶ instrument of foreign policy. Such a view also leads to the restructuring of the ¶ allocation of war-making powers that was carefully developed by the U.N. ¶ Charter and the United Nations system.¶ The idea of preventive war is an informal suspension **of the principle of self defense.** The principle of self-defense is not formally suspended or dispensed ¶ with, but is **drastically altered in the name of applying it to this perceived new ¶ circumstance**.62 A doctrine that was carefully crafted to deal with emergencies ¶ has, through the policy of preventive war, been transformed into an ordinary ¶ foreign and military policy option, the very thing that the post-WWII ¶ international order was meant to have rejected.63¶ The effect of the war on terror on the principle of self-defense – and on ¶ other aspects of national and international law – is **evidenced in more than the ¶ restructuring of the allocation of powers and the transformation of emergency ¶ measures into ordinary processes**. It is also contributing to a condition where, **in the name of fighting terrorism, the evil Other,64 the United States is turning ¶ on its own body, namely, the institutions and processes that define it** and that ¶ perhaps are the country’s best hope for providing immunity from the threats ¶ that terrorism poses. Put simply, **the war on terror is leading to an ¶ autoimmunity crisis.**

**It is a priori to refuse the totalizing drive for stability which has prioritized geopolitics over human rights.  This critical ethos is more important than the particular decision itself. The alternative is the destruction of ethics.**

Alex **Thomson**, lecturer in English at the University of Glasgow, Deconstruction and Democracy, **2005**, p. 196-197

The affirmation of this kind of analysis would need to be articulated with whatever directly strategic interventions are possible: for example either the affirmation of particular cosmopolitan or internationalist treaties and organizations, or their critique. The task of thought would be to judge as best one can which moment is most propitious for either. I have shown that Derrida’s comments on hospitality, the cosmopolitical and international law are consistent with this proposition. Such work would mean translating deconstruction not only from one institutional context to another, or showing deconstruction to be already at work there, but from one national or state context to another, and from one philosophical idiom to another. But in addition to its more familiar form as intellectual genealogy, a negotiation with the tradition of inherited political concepts, I have suggested that **deconstruction might** also **be** the model for **a mode of political analysis,** which would be **concerned with** **the** political **event as a combination of a set of depoliticizing tendencies, which together testify to the possibility of a repoliticization**. This is a project which exceeds the scope of this book. It also remains essentially ambiguous, and highly susceptible to the necessary and inevitable institutionalization of deconstruction which Derrida describes in his paper ‘Some statements and truisms ...’, and which can itself be understood as more or less equivalent to what I have designated as depoliticization. **Such analyses would have to develop out of the events themselves, rather than approaching a particular political problem with a predetermined deconstructive grid** to lay over it. Derrida’s insistence that deconstruction is what happens, that deconstruction is democracy, means not only that deconstruction can be considered as a political practice. It must lead us not only to see deconstruction as politics, but politics as deconstruction. Indeed, a deconstructive account of politics might focus not so much on what deconstruction has to say about politics, as on what politics has to tell us about deconstruction. The structure I have set out in this chapter is well described in these remarks: All that a deconstructive point of view tries to show, is that since conventions, institutions and consensus are stabilizations, this means they are stabilizations of something essentially unstable and chaotic. Thus it becomes necessary to stabilize precisely because **stability is not natural**; it is because there is instability, that stabilization is necessary; it is because there is chaos that there is a need for stability. Now this **chaos and instability, which is fundamental, founding and irreducible, is** at once **naturally the worst against which we struggle with laws, rules, conventions, politics and provisional hegemony, but at the same it is a chance**, a chance to change, **to destabilize. If there were continual stability, there would be no need for politics, and it is to the extent that stability is not natural, essential or substantial, that politics exists and ethics is possible. Chaos is at once a risk and a chance, and it is here that the possible and the impossible cross each other.** [DAP 83-4] In this context we can understand depoliticization as the effect of a stabilization in the political field. ‘**Chaos and instability’** **becomes** another name for what Derrida calls ‘**democracy-to-come’** and ‘justice’ elsewhere. Depoliticizing stabilizations of this field of forces are necessary; but **until we think chaos itself as fundamental, no** kind of **political thought will be able to grasp the 'chance** to change’ or destabilize. **This is what deconstruction offers to political theory, and it depends directly on the apparent refusal to repoliticize**, to introduce a new ontology of politics. Deconstruction is apparently both the most radical and the most ascetic alternative to such theories as those of Schmitt and Benjamin, by seeking to discover a revolutionary potential in the everyday, to discern the possibility of destabilization attested to in the maintenance of the law, and to put into question political theory as in and of itself depoliticizing. Yet Derrida insists that **repoliticization only has a chance if a decision could be thought without criteria, without rules or any defined or expected outcome**. In the vocabulary of his essay 'Psyche: Inventions of the Other’, ‘the only possible invention is the invention of the impossible’ but ‘an invention of the impossible is impossible [.. .] It is in this paradoxical predicament that a deconstruction gets under way [qu'est engagée]’ [PSY 60 / 59]. But this is not to resign ourselves to just anything happening. As Derrida argues in ‘Force of Law’, **‘incalculable justice requires us to calculate’** [POL 28 / 61]. **This calculation will not be without risk, but even in the worst circumstances, ‘there is no ethico-politi**cal decision or **gesture without** what [Derrida] would call **a “Yes” to emancipation'** [DAP 82].

**The impact is extinction. The US has been locked into a fantasy of total world control resulting in ever-escalating apocalyptic confrontation.**

**Lifton ‘3**

(Robert Jay, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Psychiatry and Psychology, The City University of New York, Superpower Syndrome, pgs. 8-11)

More than that, **9/11 is not over. We are still in it**. While writing this book, I have become aware of the ways in which I, too, am a survivor of 9/11-not in the sense of having been directly victimized by the attacks but because like all Americans, I was exposed to the intense death- related imagery of a suicidal assault on my country. Those televised images had a near-apocalyptic aura for almost everyone. Hence the immediate reference to the space where the two towers collapsed as "Ground Zero," a term previously reserved for the hypocenter of a nuclear explosion. This continuing sense of disaster places me in quite a different relationship to my subject than in my previous studies. True, most of them focused on relatively recent occurrences whose effects were very much still with us. But, Vietnam aside (and in that work I was on another continent, many thousand miles from the war in question), I was looking at them retrospectively. **It is impossible as yet to look at 9/11 in retrospect. Its active reverberations are everywhere**. We remain in thralldom to what happened on that day. **The dynamic of 9/11 dominates American thought and our current national life.** **Our invasion of Iraq reflects the web of deception** that the Bush administration, through its "war on terrorism," has **woven around the events** of that September morning. By all objective evidence Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11, but as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested on the day after the attacks, the broad definition of that "war" would require us to invade Iraq. At that moment, Iraq rose to the surface from the deeper dreams and visions of our leaders- and so the moment became one of opportunity. To facilitate that policy our leaders then either made, or encouraged by innuendo, the false claim that Iraq was indeed implicated in 9/11, and by the time of the invasion about 50 percent of Americans had come to believe that falsehood. **A deception on such a large scale could only occur because Americans remained genuinely fearful of terrorist attacks even more lethal than 9/11, and because that** fear, that **sense of vulnerability, could be manipulated to support larger and more ambitious policy aims**. It became possible to redirect the fear from Osama bin Laden to another hated Middle Eastern figure, Saddam Hussein, to the point where the two became virtually interchangeable. If anything, **American fear of another 9/11 has been intensified by the "successful" invasion and so remains available for use** in other situations. **September 11 was** a triumphant moment for Islamist fanatics-and a **profoundly humiliating** one **for the leaders of the American superpower**, who early on decided that their response would be "war" and a specifically American war at that. They then rejected a measured international response to terrorism, offered specifically by the secretary general of the United Nations, a response that would have included the use of force in focused ways short of war, to hunt down the terrorists and bring them to justice, while mobilizing the enormous outpouring of sympathy for our country expressed throughout the world. Instead, this administration chose to respond unilaterally with the rhetoric of war, making it clear that we alone would decide what levels of military force to apply and who to apply it to, accepting no restraints in the process. In that and other ways **we have responded apocalyptically to an apocalyptic challenge**. We have embarked on a series of wars-first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq, with suggestions of additional targeted countries in the offing- because we have viewed the amorphous terrorist enemy as evil and dangerous. **But our own amorphously extreme response feeds a larger dynamic of apocalyptic violence**, even **as it constructs a twenty-first-century version of American empire**. That prospective empire is confusing to the world, to Americans, and perhaps even to those who espouse it. It does not follow prior imperial models of keeping an extensive bureaucracy in place in subject countries and thereby ruling territories extending over much of the earth. Instead, **we press toward a kind of control from a distance: mobile forays of military subjugation with subsequent governmental arrangements unclear**. **Crucial to this kind of fluid world control is our dominating war machine, backed by** no less dominant **nuclear stockpiles**. **Such an arrangement can lend itself to efforts at** the remote **control of history**. Any such project, however, becomes **enmeshed in fantasy**, in dreams of imposing an omnipotent will on others, and in the urge to control history itself. **Driven by superpower syndrome, such visions of domination and control can prove catastrophic** when, as they must, they come up against the irredeemable stubbornness of reality.

**Stopping indefinite detention practices is an act of Hospitality towards the Other- autoimmunism constantly relates us to the Other, but prescribes limits to our interactions. Hospitality requires breaking open those limitations and accepting the complete unknowability to a future we shouldn’t try to control, while accepting the possibility for destruction.**

**Johnson 10’** (Andrew, Lecturer at Open University,The Pathology of Politics: Derrida’s reading of Auto-immunity and Carl Schmitt 09/12/10)

**Auto-immunity is a failed attempt by an organism to protect itself.** It is clearly connected with another age-old Derridean trope: the¶ pharmakon¶ . The biological concept of auto-immunity is a question of health. **In attempting to protect itself, it destroys itself; it plays both the role of both medicine and poison**. “[T]his poisoned medicine, this¶ pharmakon¶ of an inflexible and cruel autoimmunity” (Rogues, p. 157). “Once again the **state is both self-protecting and self-destroying,** at once remedy and poison. The¶ pharmakon¶ is another name, an old name, for this autoimmunitary logic” (Time of Terror, p. 124).As Derrida says there is no condom for auto-immunity. “**For there is no absolutely reliable prophylaxis against the autoimmune**. By definition” (Rogues, p. 150-151). Auto-immunity is pregnant with itself. **This** pharmakon **partition, between poison and medicine, between self and non-self, signifies both a threat and a chance.** Therefore, **auto-immunity is not necessarily bad.** In fact**, while it threatens, it retains a hopeful chance and hyperbolic promis**e. As Derrida says: “[O]pportunity or chance and threat, threat as chance: autoimmune” (Rogues, p. 52). “[A]lready a question of autoimmunity, of a¶ double bind ¶ of threat and chance” (Rogues, p. 82**). We must be cautious to not easily discount auto-immunity as a mere poison threatening to destroy our defenses, but as a possible medicine that opens up chances and hope.** The threat is perfectly apparent; however, what is the optimistic chance of auto-immunity? Quite simply, hospitality. In this regard, autoimmunity is not an absolute ill or evil. **It enables an exposure to the other, to what and who comes**- which means that it mustremain incalculable. **Without autoimmunity**, with absolute immunity, nothing would ever happen or arrive; **we would no longer** wait, await, or expect, no longer **expect another, or expect any event** (Rogues, p. 152).**By opening itself up to the other, threatening to destroy itself, the organism has the chance to receive the other**. The relationship of self and other is synonymous with Derrida’s ethics of hospitality. In the twilight of Derrida’s late career, he began to posit a novel attempt at ethics. One of his most important contributions is his defense of a hyperbolic ethics of unconditional hospitality**: we must remain open to the other, without conditions. A hospitality, worthy of its name, must never prescribe limits to the other if it expects to redeem its full and pure ethical value.**

**The plan is a necessary reimagining of politics. Absent this act of imagination, stagnation is inevitable.**

Ingerid S. **Straume 11’l** |  PhD in the philosophy of education, Papers by Ingerid S. Chapter in "Depoliticization; The Political Imaginary of Global Capitalism", edited by Straume and Humphrey, NSU Press2011, <http://uio.academia.edu/IngeridSStraume/Papers/401266/The_Political_Imaginary_of_Global_Capitalism>

Somewhere in the collective imaginary, there isprobably a fairly acute sense of the true state of the construction: No person raised and educated in a modern democracy can be totally ignorant of the planet's limited resources, nor of the interdependence between resource levels, policies of growth, industrial production, and the inflated level of consumption in capitalist societies.**The problem is not so much to imagine the disasters ahead, but rather to believe in the possibility of change**, as I have argued in the opening sections of this essay. To further the analysis, I now turn to my case in point, education. The following is based on the premise that **political creation draws on the capacity to visualize that society could have been different,**since society, with its norms, values, and institutions, is a social creation. To account for this premise, Cornelius Castoriadis distinguishes between what he calls the 'instituting' and the 'instituted' society. The instituting society is society's capacity for self-creation; it is society's capacity to create itself as a certain social 'form.'The instituted society is the create, i.e., the product of the instituting society, consisting of laws, norms, and institutions in which significations are embodied.  Society is self-creation. That which' creates society and history is the instituting society, as opposed to the instituted society. The instituting society is the social imaginary in the radical sense**. The self-institution of society is the creation of** a human world: of 'things/ 'reality,' **language, norms, values, ways of life and death, objects for which we live and objects for which we dies**- and of course, first and foremost, the creation of the human individual in which the institution of society is massively embedded.**57 In order to change the existing institutions** (the instituted) **and create new social imaginary significations, it is necessary to realize that things could be otherwise**. If this insight is not properly instituted, however, society will see itself as a product of forces outside its own control. The instituting society remains unacknowledged, and the instituted society is not conceived as created by society itself. For instance, capitalism could be conceived as a law-like force to which the social world is subject - one that can only be followed and cannot questioned in any profound sense.  In the sociological tradition from Max Weber, this 'deep questioning\* — i.e., political-philosophical questioning—is seen as a defining characteristic of the project of modernity itself. In modernity, the existing (traditional) social values are no longer seen as valid per definition, something which has deep implications for conscious social reproduction, and therefore, education. At least since Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, the critique of culture and civilization is constitutive of the project of modernity, and a premise of theories and practices of education. A striking example is the critical education,' taught in Nordic schools in the 1970s and 80s as a deliberate counter influence to mass culture.38 In the following, I will argue that this self-critique has now started to turn back on itself, where critique threatens to turn into cultural self-contempt. This becomes quite clear if we analyze the typical relationship between parents and children in contemporary global capitalism in light of the previously developed sections of this paper. Together with the rise of' critical consciousness' in Western societies, at least since '1968,' many parents have found themselves in a social and natural setting that they sometimes find undesirable, even disturbing and harmful. For example, the natural surroundings and countryside, which until today have been very important in the socialization of Norwegian children,39 are no longer representations of pure or clean nature. Things in the countryside, in woods, and water, are now potentially harmful in an 'unnatural\* way. This transformation happened in just a few years. The shocking implication is, of course, thathuman beings are the agents of this destruction **— humanity is undermining its own existence**. From this fact comes the notion of humanity as inherently harmful. And while we cognitively and technically appear to have the capacity, we still seem unable to stop the destruction of the natural environment. **The situation is inherently 'pathological.**' Now, **if**and when **these ideas enter the field of education** via literature, educational programs, etc. **the pathology is affirmed and consolidated**.  In the Nordic countries, for example, children's literature has tended for some time to thematize adulthood, and especially the shortcomings of adults in political and environmental matters. Books and TV-programs illustrate how 'silly' grown-ups are: always in a hurry and through their grown-up-actions ruining the environment. The authors often try to form an alliance with the children against 'the grown-ups.'60 But since the world of grown-ups is the only resource for the child in the process of becoming an adult self, the subject-position offered to the child in this literature is very problematic. Systematically denigrating adults and adult behavior is detrimental to the child's opportunities for identification, as there are no other ideals available. The child is forced to identify with ambivalence or nothing at all. My main point is that the conflict between adults and children portrayed by this literature points to a deeper conflict, between the culture and the individual — or rather, within the culture itself — where the central imaginary significations that organize Western societies, no longer offer sufficient meaning for its members. And since **capitalism's significations  — such as rational mastery**, consumerism, **and instrumentalism - still provide the compass points for our practical orientation as a collective**, the situation is deeply 'schizophrenic' It represents a form of alienation, a split within society's self-image, where the relationship between the instituting and the instituted society is distorted. As Slavoj Zizek has pointed out, we detest it, and we don't believe in it, but we still perform and live it.61 The split runs deep, arising within modern society itself, and there is no (rational) escape. This was tragically demonstrated by the Norwegian socialist minister of finance, who probably felt obliged to pose for the photographer holding shopping bags.  Still, the adult world is the only available template onto which the child's aspiration to grow up can be projected. If this world is discredited, the child is left without the cultural resources necessary to build a self. This is the problem that Hannah Arendt addressed in her controversial essay The Crisis in Education, claiming that: "Anyone who refuses to have joint responsibility for the world should not have children and must not be allowed to take part in educating them."62 In Arendt's view, adults have a duty to hand over an 'intact world\* to the next generation — even when they (the adults) wish to change this world, and wish it were otherwise. Practices of education that ignore, or are unable to follow this principle, are in a state of crisis.  Now, while the crisis I have described here is a socio-cultural one, its manifestations — as always —affect people individually and in relation to one another. For instance, children in capitalist societies express in their wishes and actions the demands of a consumer culture - a culture of which many parents are critical. In other words, the consumption-oriented, seemingly selfish attitudes of the young are, to a large extent, attitudes derived from and reflective of the consumer culture at large — played out as conflicts in the home. Hence, the parent or educator is forced to wrestle with problems far beyond the sphere of the personal and educational, such as consumerism, instrumentalism, reification, and cynicism. The  scene is set for individuals to resist their own culture; a fight they can never' win.' Ambivalence and collective self-contempt takes the stage. **Depoliticization**, as we have seen, **rests on the inability of existing institutions to provide sufficiently robust meaning to act as resources for addressing the political problems of the society in question**. Put differently: when a society is not able to justify its own significations, it is alienated from itself and its own creative capacity. Under these circumstances, **social reproduction becomes very problematic. The instituting society has given birth to** a monster — here, the institution of **capitalism** — and is paralyzed by it. **The deepest effect of depoliticization**, therefore, **is society's abdication of its own creative capacity**, which, as I have argued, also implies cultural and personal suffering.

**Hospitality towards the Other is the basis of Democracy to Come.**

**Caputo 3,** John Caputo, JCRT 4.3 AUGUST 2003, WITHOUT SOVEREIGNTY, WITHOUT BEING:

UNCONDITIONALITY, THE COMING GOD AND

DERRIDA’S DEMOCRACY TO COME, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/170918471/Caputo#download>

The question, is there something that lays claim to us unconditionally but without power or force, is directed at “us,” all of us—Americans and Europeans, democrats and theologians, Westerners and non-Westerners—*anyone* who is associated with the cruel logic of sovereignty. The d**emocracy to come calls for a new revolution, another and still more radically democratic revolution**, a revolution in the name of the democracy to come, **in which we will break** more decisively still **with** the *ancien régime* of **sovereignty itself, dreaming of the** incalculable **possibility of the impossible,** of a democracy without sovereignty. Dreaming of the incalculable, but also calculating, because one must count very carefully and carefully devise ways of counting how the member voices of the democratic assembly will count, who will be allowed to vote, at what age, with what status, etc. (V, 63). **That** revolution that is being called for will also cut deeply into our psyche and our psychology, because it **will force us to reconceive the self**, that famous liberal individual, **in terms of the other** one who lays claims to me, even as it will cut into our theology, because it will force us to reimagine God without sovereignty. God forbid! **What is called for in and by the democracy to come is the unconditional gift,** which does not seek a return on one’s investment, the gift, **in which the self gives up its power**, the power of the “I can,” the power of the possible, which is what constitutes a self. What we have asked of the king, we now must ask of ourselves: to give up power, to share and divide it. What is called for is a self that shares its power in a gift without return, a self without ipseity. **What is called for is unconditional hospitality to the other,** to the stranger and the immigrant, to the tired, the hungry and huddled masses. **What is called for is a transforming and transfixing revolution in which the self turns itself inside out and lets itself by claimed by the other.**

**Hospitality cannot function without an opening- Autoimmunism forces us to constantly relate to the other, providing space for radical action which moves us towards democracy to come.   
Miller 09** (J. Harris, *Derrida’s Politics of Autoimmunity,* Originally published 2008 in Discourse Journal, updated May 23, 2009, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/dis/summary/v030/30.1-2.miller.html>)

What should we do in this terrifying situation? What does Derrida¶ suggest that we should do? **The logic of** **autoimmunization**, the¶ reader will have noted, **has one** **positive** aspect. It keeps a community,¶ a political entity, open to the wholly other, for example, **to the**¶ **democracy to come.** That means **we** can, **must**, and should still **work**,¶ according to the classic emancipatory ideal, as best we can **in the¶ concrete situation in which we find ourselves, to move**, even were it¶ **only an inch or a centimeter, closer toward the democracy** (perhaps)¶ **to come**. It is our responsibility to do so. The present Democratic¶ Congress is making some moves in that direction.¶ Nevertheless, it will not do to be too cheerful or sanguine about¶ our ability to fulfill this measureless responsibility. One reason for¶ this, as Derrida powerfully argues in *The Gift of Death,* is **that the fulfillment¶ of one specific exigent political responsibility means “irresponsibilizing”¶ oneself in relation to all the other equally exigent¶ political obligations. Each responsibility is wholly other to all the¶ others. One cannot fulfill them all, though each is equally demanding**.¶ Beyond that, however, as Derrida says in a remarkably concentrated¶ passage in *Rogues* (*Voyous*), the last book he was able to read¶ proofs for during his mortal illness, the punctual or stigmatic instant¶ act of exercising sovereign decision, by way of the “*cracy*” in “democracy”¶ (“rule of the people” etymologically), inevitably infects the self¶ of the one who acts with suicidal autoimmunity. The passage is a¶ good example of the way a swarm of Derrida’s key terms are often at¶ work in a given short passage. Citing it in conclusion will give Derrida¶ the last word:¶ Finally, and especially, however one understands *cratic* sovereignty [*la souveraineté¶* cratique], it has appeared as a stigmatic indivisibility that always¶ contracts duration into the timeless instant of the exceptional decision.¶ Sovereignty neither gives nor gives itself the time; it does not take time.¶ Here is where the cruel autoimmunity with which sovereignty is affected¶ begins, the autoimmunity with which sovereignty at once sovereignly¶ affects and cruelly infects itself. Autoimmunity is always, in the same time¶ without duration, cruelty itself, the autoinfection of all autoaffection. It is¶ *Derrida’s Politics of Autoimmunity 223¶* not some particular thing that is affected in autoimmunity, but the self, the¶ *ipse,* the *autos* that finds itself infected. As soon as it needs heteronomy, the¶ event, time, and the other.11

**Embracing an ethic of democracy to come is essential to confront the massive every day instances of violence which support the international system.  
Derrida 1995**, dir d’etudes @ Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales Jacques, The Gift of Death  83-7

What is thus found at work in everyday discourse, in the exercise of justice, and first and foremost in the axiomatics of private, public, or international law, in the conduct of internal politics, diplomacy, and war, is a lexicon concerning responsibility that can be said to hover vaguely about a concept that is nowhere to be found, even if we can’t go so far as to say that it doesn’t correspond to any concept at all. It amounts to a disavowal whose resources, as once knows, are inexhaustible. One simply keeps on denying the aporia and antimony, tirelessly, and one treats as nihilist, relativist, even poststructuralist, and worse still deconstructionist, all those who remain concerned in the face of such a display of good conscience. The sacrifice of Isaac is an abomination in the eyes of all, and it should continue to be seen for what it is—atrocious, criminal, unforgivable; Kierkegaard insists on that. The ethical point of view must remain valid: Abraham is a murderer. However, is it not true that the spectacle of this murder, which seems intolerable in the denseness and rhythm of its theatricality, is at the same time the most common event in the world? Is it not inscribed in the structure of our existence to the extent of no longer constituting an event? It will be said that it would be most improbable for the sacrifice of Isaac to be repeated in our day; and it certainly seems that way. We can hardly imagine a father taking is son to be sacrificed on the top of the hill at Montmarte. If God didn’t send a lamb as a substitute or an angel to hold back his arm, there would still be a prosecutor, preferably with an expertise in Middle Eastern violence, to accuse him of infanticide or first-degree murder; and if a psychiatrist who was both something of a psychoanalyst and something f a journalist declared that the father was “responsible,” carrying on as if psychoanalysis had done nothing to upset the order of discourse on intention, conscience, good will, etc., the criminal father would have no chance of getting away with it. He might claim that the wholly other had ordered him to do it, and perhaps in secret (how would he know that?), in order to test his faith, but it would make no difference. Things are such that this man would surely be condemned by any civilized society. On the other hand, **the smooth functioning of such a society, the monotonous complacency of its discourses on morality, politics,** and the law, and the exercise of its rights (whether public, private, national or international), **are in no way impaired by the fact that, because of the structure of the laws of the market that society has instituted and controls, because of the mechanisms of external debt and other similar inequities, that same “society” puts to death or** (but failing to help someone in distress accounts for only a minor difference) **allows to die of hunger and disease tens of millions of children** (those neighbors or fellow humans that ethics or the discourse of the rights of man refer to) **without any moral or legal tribunal ever being considered competent to judge such a sacrifice, the sacrifice of others to avoid being sacrificed oneself**. Not only is it true that **such a society** participates in this incalculable sacrifice, it actually **organizes it.** The smooth functioning of its economic, political, and legal affairs, the smooth functioning of its moral discourse and good conscience and **presupposes the permanent operation of this sacrifice**. And such a sacrifice is not even invisible, for from time to time television shows us, while keeping them at a distance, a series of intolerable images, and a few voices are raised to bring it all to our attention. But these images and voices are completely powerless to induce the slightest effective change in the situation, to assign the least responsibility, to furnish anything more than a convenient alibi. That this order is founded upon a bottomless chaos (the abyss or open mouth) is something that will necessarily be brought home one day to those who just as necessarily forget the same. We are not even talking about wars, the less recent or most recent ones, in which cases one can wait an eternity for morality or international law (whether violated with impunity or invoked hypocritically) to determine with any degree of certainty who is responsible or guilty for the hundreds of thousands of victims who are sacrificed for what or whom one knows not, countless victims, each of those whose singularity becomes each time infinitely singular, every other (one) being every (bit) other, whether they be victims of the Iraqi state or victims of the international coalition that accuses the latter of not respecting the law. For in the discourses that dominate during such wars, it is rigorously impossible, on one side and the other, to discern the religious from the moral, the legal, from the political. The warring factions are all irreconcilable fellow worshipers of the religions of the Book. Does that not make things converge once again in the fight to the death that continues to rage on Mount Moriah over the possession of the secret of the sacrifice by an Abraham who never said anything? Do they not fight in order to take possession of the secret of the as the sign of an alliance with God and to impose its order on the other, who becomes for his part nothing more than a murderer

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## Case

#### The lack of an end does not mean the death of deconstruction, but rather a reincarnation of the present. The constant creation of new, small disturbances is necessary in an attempt to allow the end to happen TO us, rather than bringing the end about.

Caputo 7 John D. Caputo, “What Would Jesus Deconstruct,” 2007, Print, p. 52-53

If you knew very well where you were going from the start and had the means to get there, it would almost be like getting there before you even set out or like ending up where you were all along, which is what postmodernists call the “future present.” The result would be nothing new – no surprise, no discovery, no “event,” and no advent of the other, or not much of one. Real journeys are full of unexpected turns and twists, requiring a faith that can move mountains and a hope against hope, where one does not see what one was trying to do until the journey is completed, which postmodernists call the “absolute future.” Deconstruction, like the Christianity of Kierkegaard’s Johannes Cimacus, is not a Platonic “recollection,” a getting back to where you already were or a recovering of a possession that you did not realize you possessed all along. It is not a matter of becoming who you already are but of becoming something new, a matanoia, a new creation, which eye has not seen nor ear heard nor the heart imagined, an openness to the coming of the other, which we don’t already possess. Thus, in a deconstructive analysis, you could never simply “derive” an idea or a practice from its “sources,” as if it were already implicitly there. It does not flow from its “origin” as a more or less inevitable conclusion. It comes by way of an unexpected turn of events, by shattering our horizon of expectation. So when we go back to the New Testament, to any classic text or constitution, we cannot hope to simply and straightforwardly “derive” instruction from it, as if we could simply run a computer program on it. We must instead allow it to happen (arriver) to us, which in theology has to do with what the Rev. Maxwell called “the medium of the Holy Spirit” (In His Steps, 18).

#### **Autoimmunity destroys all rational decision calculus- makes violence inevitable**

#### **Miller 09** (J. Harris, Derrida’s Politics of Autoimmunity, Originally published 2008 in Discourse Journal, updated May 23, 2009, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/dis/summary/v030/30.1-2.miller.html>)

We were promised that invading and occupying Iraq would¶ make us safer at home. Exactly the opposite has happened. Iraq has¶ now become what it was not before our occupation, a breeding¶ ground for terrorists. Iran is winning control of Iraq as a result of our¶ invasion. Our standing or credit in the world has diminished immeasurably.¶ We are now the object of widespread hatred, distrust, and¶ disdain, in part because we are a rogue state that ignores international¶ law and the Geneva convention, to say nothing of our own¶ Constitution. Nobody can be sure what mad act we will next commit.¶ We torture and hold indefinitely without charge detainees in a¶ prison falsely claimed to be extraterritorial. We operate secret prisons¶ around the world where prisoners are held and tortured¶ through what is called, in an extraordinary example of double¶ speak, “Extraordinary Rendition.” We have suspended our own precious¶ civil liberties through something with the chilling Orwellian¶ name of the Patriot Act. The Department of Homeland Security has¶ conspicuously failed to secure our ports, our borders, or our chemical¶ plants and nuclear power plants. We are immensely more insecure¶ than we were before, trembling in a terror that we have¶ ourselves created. The War on Terror has conspicuously failed to do¶ anything more than multiply the terrorists, despite Bush’s boast that we would capture Osama bin Laden, “dead or alive,” and eliminate¶ the terrorist threat. That does not mean that we have not captured¶ or killed some terrorists or “foiled” some terrorist plots, but the¶ international terrorists are an invisible, anonymous, hydra-headed¶ monster that is everywhere at once, especially, we fear, in our own¶ homeland. That monster multiplies exponentially the more we¶ make war on it.¶ The War on Terror has made all of us live in terror. As Derrida¶ has argued in Le “concept” du 11 septembre (2004) (Philosophy in a Time¶ of Terror [2003] in the English version), this terror is not directed¶ toward what has happened, the destruction of the World Trade Center¶ and part of the Pentagon, but toward what we are all taught to¶ be certain will happen, something worse than the cold war, something¶ without precedent, “the worst.” It will be nothing less than the¶ end of the world as we have come to think of in these days of tele-techno economicomediatic globalization. That end may come by¶ way of global warming or by way of a “nuclear winter,” but our¶ absolute terror tells us it is bound to happen sooner or later. Derrida¶ focuses on the “nuclear menace,” with a prophetic anticipation¶ (his long interview-essay on 9/11 was given in 2001, five weeks¶ after 9/11) of our present anxiety about Iran’s development of¶ nuclear weapons or about some anonymous terrorists armed with¶ a nuclear bomb in a suitcase:¶ From now on, the nuclear threat, the “total” threat, no longer comes from¶ a state but from anonymous forces that are absolutely unforeseeable and¶ incalculable. And since this absolute threat will have been secreted by the¶ end of the Cold War and the “victory” of the U.S. camp, since it threatens¶ what is supposed to sustain world order, the very possibility of a world and¶ of any worldwide effort [mondialisation] (international law, a world market,¶ a universal language, and so on), what is thus put at risk by this terrifying¶ autoimmunitary logic [more about that terrifying logic later on (JHM)] is nothing less than the existence of the world, of the worldwide itself. . . .¶ Absolute evil, absolute threat, because what is at stake is nothing less than¶ the mondialisation or the worldwide movement of the world, life on earth¶ and elsewhere, without remainder [sans reste et rien de moins].1

## We are not pity, but rather an aporetic moment.

Caputo 7 John D. Caputo, “What Would Jesus Deconstruct,” 2007, Print, p. 71-72

First, know what the gift is and how the gift works. Know that the gift sets off the circle of return and appreciate the aporetic situation – but still give. It is impossible that the gift will not in one way or another be reciprocated, even as it is impossible to purge ourselves of every expectation of a return, for even were such purity of intention possible for our consciousness, there would be no telling what is going on in our unconscious. But still give, make the Kierkegaardian leap, seize the madness of the moment, and give, expecting no return – even though there will inevitably be a return. Circles there always are, like the poor, but in virtue of the gift the circles are opened up. The circular economies in which we conduct our lives are thereby widened, becoming more open ended and generous, expanding into ever-wider rings of generosity and beneficence. Second, to this first bit of advice, Derrida adds a second counsel: give economies a chance. Economies, after all, are all that exist, while the gift, if there even is such a thing, is the impossible. (Gifts belong to the vocative and poetic order, the economies to the colder, less poetic order of the existential and the factual.) But economies are everywhere all around us – in the workplace, the schools, medicine, the law, the government. Economies are how things happen, how they get done. Not many people can work just for their health (salut); people expect a salary (salaire) with benefits. But then again, consider what would happen if there were only economies, if nobody did anything except for a buck. Of course, teachers, lawyers, nursed, doctors, and the rest of us expect and deserve a fair wage and a decent salary; but consider what a nightmare it would be if no one did anything except for a return, if no one did anything extra, made a special effort to see that things were done well, if no one went the extra mile. That goes for employers, too – employers especially – who should not expect to exploit their workers in virtue of the deconstruction of the gift! When people on either end of a contrat are reduced to working the contract, to doing nothing but what the contract literally demands, the result is a nightmare. Economies are made fertile and productive by the gift by which they are ruptured and interrupted, punctuated, opened up, and expanded. Economies need gifts, even as the gift goes beyond what is needed.

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#### Restrictions are prohibitions

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation.

Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as;

A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb.

In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment.

Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

## Wilderson

#### Perm, do both

**Perm, do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative**

#### Perm solves- the end of the word is an act of complete pessimism, reconciliation and hope are key to solve.

John B. Hatch, Assistant Professor of Communication at the University of Dubuque, Rhetoric and Public Affairs, 2006

If substantial and widespread racial reconciliation is ever to occur, then, its advocates must continue to employ a rhetoric of hope and faith. As McPhail laments, believing that whites collectively will take adequate responsibility for their racial history after the evidence of the past five centuries requires "a major leap of faith, the same leap of faith that has historically sustained African American rhetorical practices and theories." [50](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v009/9.2hatch.html" \l "FOOT50) Perhaps reconciliation's rhetoric, which is gaining a wider hearing today than in the past, is what is needed to renew such flagging faith. Indeed, Doxtader has called reconciliation "a working faith in the works of words." **[51](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v009/9.2hatch.html" \l "FOOT51)** It is also a rhetoric of hope, **[52](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v009/9.2hatch.html" \l "FOOT52)** calling forth the power to jointly fashion public goods that do not yet exist—in part by presupposing their reality at some deeper level. Doxtader's statement that reconciliation's comic motives (as I have explicated them) "seem to presuppose a bit of what they are intended to create," **[53](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v009/9.2hatch.html" \l "FOOT53)** while meant as a warning, surely identifies reconciliation's promise as well. Much of the theology of reconciliation draws on the ontological assumption that goodness is more fundamental than evil. Absent such a rhetoric of faith and hope, would Tutu or Mandela have even attempted to bring about reconciliation in South Africa? And does the idea of black reparations for slavery have a chance to gain a hearing, without a hopeful rhetoric of reconciliation? Yet hope is only of value to the extent that it ultimately galvanizes action to transform reality. And the reality of race in America remains largely tragic for blacks, while many whites seem to have their heads in the color-blind clouds. There are glimmers of hope to help reconciliation's proponents keep the faith, such as Brooks's innovative proposal, which infuses the hope of healing into a call for reparations, and the Senate's recent apology for its past record of having blocked anti-lynching legislation until 1968, [54](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v009/9.2hatch.html" \l "FOOT54) an act of redress that sets a precedent for making a slavery apology. However, as Doxtader warns, the comic promise of reconciliation's horizon may not be enough to turn the beneficiaries of oppression back on themselves to question the grounds of their identity (and prosperity). The tragic reality of unequal and conflictual race relations might have to go from bad to worse before reconciliation's call to atonement becomes compelling. In other words, Wilson's second option for making reconciliation viable remains a troublingly live one: "Reconciliation also might have a chance if the United States entered a period of crisis that [End Page 271] threatened the systems that maintain racially disparate power relations." [55](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v009/9.2hatch.html" \l "FOOT55) One can only hope that whites, as well as blacks and the American public as a whole, will recognize reconciliation's kairos in this generation without having to experience some form of social chaos first.

#### Wilderson’s conception of the unavoidable anti-black ontology only applies to conceptions of modernity- that’s not the aff. Constantly reinforcing dualism is the origination of racism. An intersectional approach with a focus on anti-blackness solves best.

Wise 6 Tim, Wise has provided anti-racism training to teachers nationwide, and has conducted trainings with physicians and medical industry professionals on how to combat racial inequities in health care. He has also trained corporate, government, entertainment, military and law enforcement officials on methods for dismantling racism in their institutions, and has served as a consultant for plaintiff’s attorneys in federal discrimination cases in New York and Washington State. LIP Magazine, 5-23, www.lipmagazine.org

While most of the left has long argued that capitalism is the primary impediment to peace and stability — whether economic, ecologic or otherwise — in fact, white world supremacy may be at least as critical, if not more so. Indeed, the extent to which capitalism is itself an outgrowth of European/white supremacy has been underappreciated by most on the left (particularly the white left, for reasons that are probably easy to understand). Marimba Ani, in her classic work Yurugu: An African Centered Critique of European Cultural Thought and Behavior, and Charles Ephraim, in The Pathology of Eurocentrism, (among others), have argued persuasively that competitive systems of economics did not simply develop naturally, as if by some Marxian edict of logical progression. Rather, they grew principally out of the dualistic mindset so common to European cultural thought and systems, stemming from Platonic and Aristotelian ethics. The splitting off of reason from emotion, now to be seen as conflicting human characteristics, or t**he splitting of nature from humanity**, whereby the latter is seen as in need of controlling the former, and other such dyads, led to the creation of market systems, as well as racism and patriarchy. Ani explains that Plato laid the groundwork of “an elaborate trap:” “Once the person was artificially split into conflicting faculties or tendencies, it made sense to think in terms of one faculty ‘winning’ or controlling the other(s). And here begins a pattern that runs with frighteningly predictable consistency throughout European thought…The mind is trained from birth to think in terms of dichotomies or ‘splits,’ (which) become irreconcilable, antagonistic opposites…one is considered ‘good,’ positive, superior; the other is considered ‘bad,’ negative, inferior. And unlike the Eastern conception of the Yin and the Yang, or the African principle of ‘twinness,’ these contrasting terms are not conceived as complementary and necessary parts of a whole. They are, instead, conflicting and ‘threatening’ to one another…it is this dichotomized perception of reality on which the controlling presence (imperialistic behavior) depends.” To clarify: I am not saying that racism, in modern terms, preceded capitalism or patriarchy. Rather, I am suggesting that a particular way of viewing reality and the world — a dominant cultural paradigm, or what scholars call cosmology — emanating from Europe, having first taken root in ancient Greece and Rome, is what made the class system (ultimately capitalism), the gender system (patriarchy) and the race system (white supremacy) inevitable. All three are essentially European. What began as a system of cultural imperialism, and Christian religious imperialism, later became racialized, with the creation of the concept of the white race. Although this concept was, as Theodore Allen has noted, largely crafted so as to rationalize oppression of African peoples, and to divide and conquer economically oppressed persons from one another, what Marxist theorists have often ignored is the origin of class conflict itself, which was necessary for either capitalism or racism to blossom.

#### Alt kills inspiration- radical hopelessness is unsustainable. The aff uses an open, participatory process that engages with communities and empowers them to retake their agency. This offers more than a bleak view of the end of civilizations.

Tokar 10 Brian, Institute for Social Ecology, a lecturer in Environmental Studies at the University of Vermont. principal organizer of the widely publicized "biodevastation" protests, Vermont Genetic Engineering Action Network, Perspectives in Anarchist Theory (2010) Movements for Climate Action: Toward Utopia or Apocalypse?

If technological fixes are insufficient to usher in an age of renewable technologies, is the situation hopeless? Is a nihilistic response, anticipating a cataclysmic “end of civilization,” the only viable alternative? Are we limited to a future of defensive battles against an increasingly authoritarian world of scarcity and climate chaos? Or can the prefigurative dimensions of earlier, more hopeful radical ecological movements be renewed in our time? Dystopian outlooks are clearly on the rise in today’s anti-authoritarian left. “Anarchists and their allies are now required to project themselves into a future of growing instability and deterioration,” writes Israeli activist and scholar Uri Gordon. He acknowledges the current flowering of permaculture and other sustainable technologies as a central aspect of today’s experiments toward “community self-sufficiency,” but views these as “rear guard” actions, best aimed to “encourage and protect the autonomy and grassroots orientation of emergent resistances” in a fundamentally deteriorating social and political climate.31 Derrick Jensen, one of the most prolific and popular anti-authoritarian writers today, insists that a rational transition to an ecologically sustainable society is impossible, and that the only sensible role for ecologically aware activists is to help bring on the collapse of Western civilization. Hope itself, for Jensen, is “a curse and a bane,” an acceptance of powerlessness, and ultimately “what keeps us chained to the system.” Well before Barack Obama adopted a vaguely defined “Hope” as a theme of his presidential campaign, Jensen argued that hope “serves the needs of those in power as surely as belief in a distant heaven; that hope is really nothing more than a secular way of keeping us in line.”32 This view is considerably at odds with decades of historical scholarship and activist praxis. Radical hopelessness may be sufficient to help motivate young people to confront authorities when necessary, but it seems unlikely to be able to sustain the lifetimes of radical thought and action that are necessary if we are to create a different world. As social movement historian Richard Flacks has shown, most people are only willing to disrupt the patterns of their daily lives to engage in the project he terms “making history” when social grievances become personal, and when they have a tangible sense that a better way is possible. This, for Flacks, is among the historic roles of democratic popular movements, to further the idea “that people are capable of and ought to be making their own history, that the making of history ought to be integrated with everyday life, that [prevailing] social arrangements … can and must be replaced by frameworks that permit routine access and participation by all in the decisions that affect their lives.”33 Flacks’ expansive view of democracy resonates well with social ecology’s long-range, community-centered vision. Bookchin’s reconstructive outlook is rooted in direct democracy, in confederations of empowered communities challenging the hegemony of the state and capital, and in restoring a sense of reciprocity to economic relationships, which are ultimately subordinated to the needs of the community. He viewed these as essential steps toward restoring harmony to human relations, and to the reharmonization of our communities with non-human nature. Further, in his 1970s and eighties’ anthropological studies, Bookchin sought to draw out a number of ethical principles common to preliterate, or “organic” societies, that could further illuminate the path toward such a reharmonization. These include anthropologist Paul Radin’s concept of the irreducible minimum – the idea that communities are responsible for satisfying their members’ most basic human needs – and an expanded view of social complementarity, through which communities accept responsibility to compensate for differences among individuals, helping assure that differences in skill or ability in particular areas will not serve to rationalize the emergence of new forms of hierarchy. Rather than prescribing blueprints for a future society, Bookchin sought to educe principles from the broad scope of human history that he saw as expressing potentialities for further human development. His outlook on social change is resonant with the best of the utopian tradition, as described in a recent essay by Randall Amster, who describes utopia as a dynamic process and not a static place … attaining a harmonious exchange with nature and an open, participatory process among community members are central features of these [utopian] endeavors; that resistance to dominant cultures of repression and authoritarianism is a common impetus for anarcho utopian undertakings; and that communities embodying these principles are properly viewed as ongoing experiments and not finished products.34 While people of different material circumstances and cultural backgrounds would surely emphasize differing needs and inclinations in their search for a better society, such a long-range utopian perspective can help us comprehend the fullest scope of human possibilities. This view clearly has far more to offer than a bleak “end of civilization” outlook, both for people in Northern countries facing increasingly chaotic weather, as well as to the majority of people around the world who are experiencing more direct consequences of climate disruptions. It is the hope for a better society, along with the determination and support necessary to intervene to challenge current inequities, that has inspired people around the world to refuse to accept an oppressive status quo and act to take the future into their hands.

#### ---Straume

#### Failure to repoliticize the economy will result in elite takeover of public institutions – effectively neutralizing the potential to check neoliberal economic policy

Dulci, 2k9

[Otavio Soares, sociologist and political scientist and is a professor in international relations at PUC-Minas, *Economics and Politics in the Global Crisis*, Estud. Av. Vol.23 Sao Paulo, 2009]

The latter returned in a recycled manner, presented as an alternative to the crisis of the State. The scale tipped toward the market. **The principle of depoliticization of the economy gained space and was made concrete in the privatization initiatives**, **deregulation and reduction of government role** (as well as of its size and cost). **But the handling of political resources**, **the means of control and power**, **was essential for all of this to take place**. Only through ideological credulity could it be said that the market would recover its function as a spontaneous skeleton of social life. From the time period suggested above, we could infer that the neoliberal globalization project was affirmed dialectically, through confrontations against internal antagonists (unions, civil servants, social movements) or external ones (the communist block and later the terrorist networks and the “Axis of Evil”), nourished by constant mobilization against real or manufactured enemies. **The hegemony of financial capitalism could only be achieved by political means**, **through the opportune management of power resources**. This can be demonstrated by a study of the relations between economic and political elites in several countries. **The image of a “revolving door” has been used to portray the constant circulation of members of the elites through government positions and private companies**. **Such interchange is notorious in the financial field and affects the governability of the system**, **as the current crisis has made clear**. **Perhaps this reality is what could be expected from a “less government**, **more market” movement**, **meaning less power to the public bureaucracy and more power to business**, **bankers and private managers in general**. It does make sense as long as the responsibilities are properly shared. **Hegemony**, to recall Gramsci, **is intellectual and moral leadership**. **For this reason**, **one of the principal consequences of the crisis is that the absolute power of financial capital has been put into question**. Capitalism as a system is not at risk, but **the banks**, **investment institutions**, **risk analysis agencies and all of the paraphernalia that developed around them**, **have lost clout**. **To rebuild their reputation**, **the banks and financial market agents will have to reestablish their primordial function as support for the real economy**. This is a normative proposition but has a practical side, given that the big international banks are not able to confront the crisis without government help. **Therefore**, **they must submit to certain political conditions**. The governments, representing public opinion, demand greater transparency and management austerity, given the revelations of huge salaries, benefits and gratifications bestowed on the administrators of banks and institutions on the brink of insolvency. A true salary bubble was revealed, which was not linked to reality. Even worse, it was not tied to the interests of the companies themselves, which were paying dearly for those who led them to the abyss for short term gains. **Nothing could be farther from the puritan ethic that justified capitalism**. **With the government rescue of banks and companies**, **the principle of separation between the ec onomy and politics was broken**. In other words, **governments** once again **came to participate directly in the game**, **and in a strong position**. Even if this is seen as an emergency measure, **it is a situation that moves the pendulum toward the State**, **as occurred in the crisis that began in 1929**. Is it possible that we are facing the end of an era, as in the 1930s? he comparison between the two crises has been frequent, and not by chance. The causes of both events were quite similar. The direction of the process has also followed the same course, from the center to the periphery of the world capitalist system. Both began in the financial arena and extended to the real economy. Or, according to the suggestive expression used in U.S. debate, the crisis began on Wall Street and spread to Main Street, where the common citizens live. Nevertheless, the world was very different 80 years ago. It was more rural and provincial than today. Many of the current countries were still colonies. Trade was more limited, and the scale of transactions relatively modest. The international division of labor distinguished the few industrial countries from the others, which sold agricultural products or minerals and purchased manufactured goods. In any case, the political and social consequences of the crash of 1929 are worth considering. They were of broad scope. **There was a collapse in the belief in liberal values and in a world guided by the self-regulated market**. **In its place**, as we indicated before, active, **interventionist governments asserted themselves**, varying from moderate to deep intervention and even total intervention (totalitarianism). The central values of the 1930s were the strong state, nationalism, racism, corporativism, the command economy and widespread politicization of social life. Due to the economic crisis, countries became more insulated. Each attempted to survive on its own. Trade and exchange declined. The international order was compromised, the arms race expanded and a solution for global disorder was only achieved at the end of a long world war which cost millions of lives. The only positive balance was the emphasis on the social question. Although in many cases (as in Brazil), that advance replaced a constructive approach to the question of democracy. T he most ominous political consequences of that time – dictatorships and war – do not seem probable, at least in the short term. Nevertheless, xenophobia and racial pressures cannot be discarded. They are already manifest in ethnic conflicts in Europe and other continents, and could be aggravated by the unemployment generated by the economic crisis. Barriers to immigration could certainly be tightened, and, in any case, the exodus of the poor towards the rich countries is not likely in times of want. If the flow is inverted, and immigrants return home, how will they be re-integrated, and what are the consequences of the lost flow of foreign currency which immigrants had sent from abroad? In the Central American countries, for example, those resources represent an important portion of national income. In the economic arena, there are certain analogies that are not surprising. One impulse similar to that found in the Depression is protectionism. The initial U.S. measures to confront the economic crisis, for example, displayed a tendency to treat it as an internal problem that did not involve the rest of the world. Their autism was revealed in the congressional attempts to introduce protective “buy American” clauses in the Obama government’s large public spending package. Of course broad reactions from abroad led legislators to review the package – particularly because the U.S. has often made open market demands on other countries. In situations such as that which the world is undergoing, there is a broad call for governments to act quickly and decisively, looking only inwards. Even so, **it is important to indicate that the best alternative to overcome the crisis is represented by coordinated measures**, **instead of each country for himself efforts**. **Unlike 1929**, **there is now an embryo of global governance composed of multilateral entities and government forums** (particularly G-20), **which are capable of promoting the search for joint solutions**. **Insofar as the various interests and needs are placed on the agenda**, **we have a chance to advance in a constructive direction**. **This would mean**, among other things, **focusing on production and labor more than on financial capitalism and on unchecked rent seeking**, **and also to approach the planet’s environmental challenges**. **A crisis involves risks**, **but also creates opportunities**. **The current crisis curbed the “irrational exuberance” of globalized capitalism and the unsustainable pace of consumption and use of resources which**, **as we well know**, **are not unlimited**. **The opportunity to rethink this route is essential and cannot be lost**.

#### Case outweighs and solves the K-

#### Speaking for others DA

#### The affirmative’s act of speaking on behalf of the oppressed only relegates them to further oppression. Two white men relegating the Black body to inevitable

Professor Linda **Alcoff 92** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

Feminist discourse is not the only site in which **the problem of speaking for others** has been acknowledged and addressed. In anthropology there is similar discussion about whether it is possible to speak for others either adequately or justifiably. Trinh T. Minh-ha explains the grounds for skepticism when she says that anthropology **is "mainly a conversation of `us' with `us' about `them,' of the white man with the white man about the primitive**-nature man...**in which `them' is silenced. `Them' always stands on the other side of the hill, naked and speechless...`them' is only admitted among `us', the discussing subjects, when accompanied or introduced by an `us'..."** Given this analysis, even ethnographies written by progressive anthropologists are a priori regressive because of the structural features of anthropological discursive practice.

**Hospitality is the most effective method to overcome racism – our discussion in this round allows us to exercise our own agency to confront constructions of the other.**

Nathan **Crawford 09** (“Race and Hospitality: Pursuing Racial Reconciliation through Derrida’s Understanding of Hospitality,” October 6 2009 http://theotherjournal.com/2009/10/06/race-and-hospitality-pursuing-racial-reconciliation-through-derrida%E2%80%99s-understanding-of-hospitality/)

Lastly, the white person must understand that because racism exists as a result of the majority and because members of the majority are the beneficiaries of racism, overcoming racism is not the responsibility of the other but the responsibility of the majority. In practicing hospitality, the majority must take responsibility and action on part of the minority, not allowing them to continue living in oppression through structures that say they end racism when they continue to perpetuate it. This means the creation of a society where people can exist differently, where the majority is not threatened by the minority, and where the minority is given the opportunity to become what it can through the actions of the majority. The necessity here, then, is to create a structure that is not hegemonic or totalizing, but moves with the other. This is what hospitality does. By taking responsibility for the other, the majority speaks with the other by critiquing the structures that have perpetuated racism. This means that the majority enters into serious dialogue with the other, dialogue that is meant to give voice to the other, not to tell the other how she is supposed to live or exist. By taking responsibility for the other, the majority works toward an alternative structure that avoids promoting injustice and oppression through things like housing projects, which usher the poor minority out of the sight of the majority, and builds a place where the other exists in the sight and hearing of the majority, like putting a housing project next to Central Park in New York City or on the Magnificent Mile in Chicago. Here, no longer can the majority ignore the plight of those who have been oppressed so that the majority can exist and prosper financially; rather, by taking responsibility for the other, the majority brings the other into the very structures that have kept her out. We see, then, that a structure of hospitality, in contrast to the current liberal approach, takes seriously the place and plight of the minority by opening oneself to the other in order to understand the other. Minorities do not need to become like whites, but they need to be given the resources to overcome the systems of oppression that continue to impede them. These resources cannot be structures that look to end oppression but really perpetuate it; rather, the resources must be our very selves, speaking with the other to the majority to overcome the racism that continues to oppress. A society that approaches the issue of race through hospitality offers such an approach by not necessitating a method or right way of action but by pursuing a state of being-with the minority and thereby overcoming together the racism of American society. The liberal approach refuses to do this because it continues to measure success against the white ideal. The approach of hospitality counters the liberal approach by arguing that there is no white ideal and that liberalism upholds oppressive structures which cause injustice and actually endorse the white ideal. In contrast, hospitality welcomes the other, listens to the other, exists with the other, and in so doing, takes responsibility for the other in a way that brings the other to resist the oppression of the majority.

#### ADDITIONALLY \_ Normalized and invisible forms of violence are easily ignored as we demand a revolution or end of the world- it glosses over the experience of people that fall outside their one-size-fits-all approach to identity, such as black political elites or people of color protesting indefinite detention. The K requires that acts of discrimination that cannot be perfectly understood as stemming from anti-blackness remain invisible to claim solvency. SH ev from the 1AC indicates that their denial not only makes it impossible to completely explain the discrimination inherent in the SQ but also makes genocide, war, and the “last and final catastrophe” inevitable.

#### Alt fails –Their pessimism just results in complicity in oppression. They are just the opposite site of the coin from people who say that hegemonic state action is always necessary and that the government should control everything. This represents a pure unity. The perm is a form of agonism, recognizing the problems with the institution, and embracing that we can never completely overcome those problems, but should constantly work towards making things better.

**Caputo 97**

Now, having said this -again very simply, in a way which is too¶ simple - I think we do not have to choose between unity and multiplicity¶ . Of course , deconstruction - that has been its strategy up to¶ now - insisted not on multiplicity for itself but on the heterogeneity the difference, the disassociation , which is absolutely necessary for the¶ relation to the other. What disrupts the totality is the condition for the¶ relation to the other. The privilege granted to unity, to total ity, to¶ organic ensembles, to community as a homogenized whole - th is is a¶ danger for responsibility, for decisio n , for ethics, for politics . That is¶ why I insisted on what prevents unity from closing upon itself, from¶ being ched up. This is not only a matter of description, of saying that¶ this is the way it is. It is a matter of accounting for the possibility of¶ responsibility, of a decision , of ethical commitments . To understand¶ this, you have to pay attention to what I would call singularity. Singularity¶ i s not simply unity or multiplicity. Now, this does not mean that¶ we have to destroy all forms of unity wherever they occur. [ have n ever¶ said anything like that. Of course, we need unity, some gathering,¶ some configuration . You see, pure unity or pure multiplicity - when¶ there is only total ity or unity and when there is only multipli city or¶ disassociation - is a synonym of death . What interests me is the limit¶ of every attempt to totalize, to gather, versammeln - and I will come¶ to this German word in a moment, because it is important for m e - the¶ limit of this u n ifying, uniting movement, the limit that it had to e n counter,¶ because the relationship o f t h e unity t o itself i mplies some dif¶ ference.¶ To be more concrete, take the example of a person or of a c u lture.¶ We often i nsist nowadays on cultural identity - for i nsta n ce, national¶ identity, l i n guistic identity, and so on . Sometimes the struggles under¶ the banner of cultural identity, national identity, linguistic identity,¶ are noble fights. But at the same time the people who fight for their¶ identity must pay attention to the fact that identity is not the self identity¶ of a thing, this glass , for instance, this microphone, but implies¶ a difference within identity. That is, the identity of a culture is a¶ way of being different from itself; a culture is different fro m itself; language¶ is different from i tself; the person is different from its elf. Once¶ you take into account this inner and other difference, then you pay¶ attention to the other and you understand that fighting for you r own¶ identity is not exclusive of another identity, is open to another identity.¶ And this prevents totalitarianism , nationalism , egocentrism, and so¶ on . That is what I tried to demonstrate in the book called The Other¶ Heading: in the case of culture, person, nation, language, identity is a¶ self-differentiating identity, an identity different from itself, having an¶ open i ng or gap w ithin itself [AC I S-17/0H 9- 1 1 ) . That totally affects¶ a structure, but it is a duty, an ethical and political duty, to take into¶ account this impossibility of being one with oneself. It is because I am¶ not one with myself that I can speak with the other and address the¶ other. That is not a way of avoiding responsibility. On the contrary, it¶ is the only way for me to take responsibility and to make decisions.

#### Even if they claim not to abandon the state in it’s totality – this is NOT the same as engaging the state in the debate space. DERRIDA both contends that institutional engagement is crucial to changing the institutions and to spurring the most productive forms of resistance. And STRAUME indicates that our act of imagination of a good governmental action allows us to change our own views of the world. Imagining a plan in which the autoimmune government can perform an act of hospitality creates a moment of aporia. This cannot be accomplished without discussing indefinite detention. This unique agonism created by challenging the institutions that create discrimination provides the best mechanism for addressing violence.

#### Pessimism is counter-productive – We should investigate the ways we can begin to eradicate black social death through ending the energy apartheid rather than devolving into nihilism.

Holley 1-18 -13, Eugene Holley Jr, Eugene Holley, Jr. is a journalist, essayist and radio producer. He has been published in a wide variety of publications and websites including Allaboutjazz.com, Amazon.com, Down Beat, Jazziz, JazzTimes, Hispanic, The New York Times Book Review, Vibe, The Village Voice, and Wax Poetics. AlterNet, Wake Up, People! How to Get Past African-American Pessimism in the Age of Obama

Barack Obama takes the oath of office for the second time as president on Monday, January 21 on the 150th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation. Once again, a black man becomes the most powerful human being on the planet. Black children will continue to see someone who looks like them in charge, and many in the older generation will smile brighter and step livelier, thanking the Creator for allowing them to behold the closest thing they’ll see to the Promised Land. But there’s a generation in between – too young to remember the bloody Civil Rights battles of the 1960s, and too old to feel unadulterated hope. Some members of this African-American generation see Obama’s accomplishment through a veil of indifference. For them, feeling good about Obama is blocked by a Negroidal nihilism too high to get over; too low to get under. I’ve talked to some of these folks about how Obama’s election is the potent proof that white supremacy can now be written in lower-case. I’ve pointed out to them that while racism is not dead, it certainly is dead-on-arrival as the unmoving, unchanging, unwavering force that conscripts the black, brown and beige to the gray hells of second-class citizenship. But for some, it’s hard to see the possibilities that await us. They tilt their head, shrug their shoulders, or just give you that old standby: the “Negro, please” look, designed to banish you from the tribe for not knowing “what time it is.” Afro-pessimism is rampant in the hood, but it also lives in academia. Dr. Cornel West, when asked if he would serve in Obama’s White House [3], said, “[t]hat’s not my calling. Yeah, brother, you find me in a crackhouse before you find me in the White House." Afro-pessimism comes from a painful and brutal history of slavery and its aftermath. And statistics tell us that we still have a lot not to cheer about, like the 14 percent unemployment rate among blacks (nearly double the national average) or the monstrous murder rate in Chicago, where 80 percent of the 500 homicide victims in 2012 [4] were black. We are depressed when we hear that the gap in high school graduation rates [5] for white and black males only narrowed by 3 percent in 10 years, and when we learn that, stunningly, 40.2 percent of all prison inmates are black [6], even though we are only 13.6 percent of the U.S. population. Those horrors are real. But what is also real is that against unimaginable odds, we are still here. We forged ourselves, with the full, white weight of the Western world bearing down us, into what W.E.B. Du Bois called “a small nation of people.” This black nation is united less by any single African, pre-American past than by what Ralph Ellison termed “an identity of passions.” We are a multicolored branch of humanity that won a centuries-spanning struggle that liberated master and slave. To say that we all emerged in heroic fashion would be a lie. Being human, people tend to go inward and internalize the degradation and lack of hope around them. That, of course, is not an exclusively black thing, as evidenced by the sad condition of Native Americans, Kurds, Roma and many other oppressed people on the planet. While pessimism under unrelenting and brutal conditions is understandable, it ceases to be useful when we refuse to believe that better conditions are possible because believing it sets us up for disappointment. The presidency of Barack Obama becomes too much to process, and we shy away from the work of overhauling negative thinking. We shift into thinking that any kind of African-American advancement is a sham, a trick, a hustle; an unforgivable delusion unfit for those who keep it real. Afro-pessimism is bad enough when it’s just about lack of positive action. But it plays out in our young people in the worst aspects of popular and hip-hop culture, where a black kid is called “acting white” for speaking in non-accented Standard English, and God forbid, excelling in school. Add those incendiary ingredients to the American-as-apple-pie love for violence and you have a recipe for reverse-revolution; where black prison culture is celebrated and rewarded by the larger white community and by the media’s insatiable appetite for black life on the mean streets. The good news is that Afro-pessimism is a cultural response, and though it is shaped by socio-economic forces, it is reversible through the same kind of positive, cultural engineering that all humans are capable of. For starters, Afro-pessimists should consider our political history – as black people, and as Americans. Remember that most of our victories don’t happen overnight. Second, we need to carefully scrutinize the president’s policies and the strategies that underpin them. As the Harvard sociologist Orlando Patterson wrote in the New York Times [7]: “Mr. Obama’s writings, politics and personal relations suggest ... that he prefers a three-pronged strategy. First, he is committed to the universalist position that the best way to help the black and Latino poor is to help all disadvantaged people, Appalachian whites included. The outrage of black over-incarceration will be remedied by quietly reforming the justice system … Second, Mr. Obama appears convinced that residential segregation lies at the heart of both black problems and cultural racism. He is a committed integrationist and seems to favor policies intended to move people out of the inner cities. Third, he clearly considers education to be the major solution and has tried to lavishly finance our schools, despite the fiscal crisis. More broadly, he will quietly promote policies that celebrate the common culture of America, emphasizing the extraordinary role of blacks and other minorities in this continuing creation.” Here are two examples that support Patterson’s analysis: 1) the president’s expansion of the Child Tax Credit and Earned Income Tax Credit in 2010, which benefited about 2.2 million African American families and nearly half of all African American children, while extending unemployment insurance to benefit over a million African Americans; and 2) the African-American Education Initiative, an executive order created to improve the “… educational outcomes for African Americans of all ages; and help ensure that African Americans receive a complete and competitive education that prepares them for college, a satisfying career, and productive citizenship.” Examining evidence of Obama’s positive effect on the black community can help lift the veil of Afro-pessimism, and allow us to view his reelection in a more realistic and positive light. Remember, we are witnessing an event that was unimaginable less than 10 years ago. If a black, mixed-race brother raised in Hawaii and Indonesia, with a Muslim-sounding name a few years after 9/11 can win the presidency twice – especially after four years of vicious racist attacks – then simply put, all is possible. We no longer have the option of rising to our lowest expectations.

#### Addressing problems created by political institutions is the best way to challenge anti-blackness. Without learning about the institutional and historical context of discriminations, college students are politically ignorant and lack civic agency.

Bush ‘11

Melanie, Associate Professor and Chair, Anthropology & Sociology @ Adelphi University, Everyday Forms of Whiteness: Understanding Race in a “Post-Racial” World, p. 235-236

Carol Geary Schneider, president of the Association of American Colleges and Universities, has been quoted as saying, "Very few courses in the contemporary undergraduate curriculum directly address democratic principles and/or aspirations" (Schneider 1999, 9). She further asked where in the curriculum are students engaged about concepts of justice, democracy, equality, opportunity, and liberty and suggested that these challenging topics belong in general education because they are integral dimensions of American pluralism and must be understood in the context of their historical connections(Schneider 1999, 9). This engagement is central to the development of civic responsibility and social awareness as a core tenet of higher education. While most of the work on civic engagement does not speak to the issues of involvement in political projects or the world of social movements, the history of democracy in the United States alone and certainly globally is one that situates these activities squarely within the realm of liberal education and civic engagement. This may be avoided out of concern for partisanship, because of a perception that service is good, activism is problematic or is a result of efforts to sustain the status quo. Regardless of the reason, it is important to note the significant value that comes from political involvement especially aimed not only on raising awareness or affecting individuals, but also toward structural change(Bush and Little 2009). Learning about political institutions**,** issues, contexts, and practices should be an integral part of that enterprise(liberal arts education). College graduates cannot make sense of their environment and their place in it if they are politically ignorant, unskilled, and lacking in a sense of civic agency, the sense that they can work with others to solve problems that concern them—in their communities, workplaces**,** .. ." (Colby 2008: 8 ) Overall, every opportunity to advance a broad-based and deepened understanding about the global dynamics of white supremacy, including its material impact on the lives of all people, should be pursued. This effort couldcultivate a counter narrative that deals with white racism from "cradle to grave."29 It can also provide incentive tothe large numbers of white peopleoutside the ruling class, whose acceptance of the status quo contributes to the entrenchment of the patterns of racial inequality and injustice that threaten our future, **to** perhaps **redefine their allegiances** and reconfigure their notion of "who's to blame."

## Cap

### Perm do both – hospitality acts as a radical strike against the current capitalist politics

### The plan is the radical invention of a new international relations, one radically open politics of the future. The plan acknowledges our international ethical responsibility to the other while it understand the boundaries of national identity and sovereignty. The juxtaposition of this dissolves the unquestioned power of sovereignty and builds toward a new world of justice and democracy-to-come.

Caputo ‘97

(John D., David R. Cook Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Villanova University, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, pgs. 116-120)

This is not to say that Derrida lacks a concept of history--a common complaint about him and a common misunderstanding of the il n'y a pas de hors-texte notion. On the contrary, by depriving himself of the idea of either a teleological or an eschatological heading, Derrida has developed a more spare and radical idea of historical happening. For a culture to be "on the move" with otherwise-than-a-heading means to hold itself more radically open to a "future" (l'avenir), to what is to come (à venir). History, thus, is not a course set in advance headed toward its telos as toward a future-present, a foreseeable, plannable, programmable, anticipatable, masterable future. History means, rather, to set sail without a course, on the prow for something "new." Such an open-ended, non-teleological history is just what Derrida means by "history," which means for him that something--an "event" -- is really happening, e-venting (é-venir), breaking out, tearing up the circular course of Greco-German time. History is not programmed in advance, for Derrida, not set to work within a pre-set archeo-teleological horizon, kept all along on course, keeping its head and its heading by way of some sort of ontological automatic-pilot ( AC 22-24/ OH17-19). That is why when something comes along that nobody foresaw, that surprises the daylight out of us, we say it is very "historical." Everybody--from Ronald Reagan to the most internationally famous "Sovietologists" in all the world's most advanced "advanced institutes"--was left speechless by the "historic" turn of events in the "former" Soviet Union. Who would have believed any of us would have lived to use that phrase--as recently as ten years ago? The paradigmatic gesture of European "modernity" for Derrida is an "auto-biographical" project in which European thinkers tell the story of Europe as the avant-garde and "promontory" of the West--and on this point Heidegger could not be more modernist--composing a eulogy to a Europe that sets the heading for Western, indeed global destiny. That is the line that Derrida would have Europe drop, so as not to close itself within its own identity, and so as to set out instead for another shore, the shore of the other, of the tout autre, "the beyond of this modern tradition" ( AC33/ OH29). That is why the present nationalist tremors in Central Europe ought not to be described as a "crisis" of the European "spirit." For a crisis--of which there are Hegelian, Heideggerian, and Husserlian versions--is a thoroughly modernist idea that has to do with a "dramatic instant of decision" (krinein) in which European self-identity is at stake. It was all the hype about a spiritual crisis--of the debilitation of the German and Western Spirit, its Entmachung--that fueled the fires of Heidegger's National Socialism (and that of quite a few others, too). Even today Francis Fukuyama can proclaim that the world-historical decision has been made, the crisis resolved, the end reached. Europe has reached its teleological fulfillment as the whole globe has opted--is still opting, the crisis will be over in a matter of weeks, now--for Euro-American "capitalism" and a market economy, and the Evil Empire has come crashing to the ground (kaputt). Derrida would warn us against not one but two "capitalisms" (from caput), by which he means two too powerful headings, the one having to do with a cultural hegemony, the rule of European "culture," emblematized by the European "capitals" (la capitale, the capital city), and the other the hegemony of economic capitalism (le capitale), the one criticized by Marx in Das Kapital. If we were to force a "philosophy of history" out of deconstruction, which would be too prestigious a label (heading) for Derrida, we might say that deconstruction can be viewed as an attempt to extricate us from two too dominant headings that are trying to steer everything and thereby to restore the play or slack or chance with which history happens. (1) In the "Roundtable," Derrida expresses his concern about the current state of "international law" and "international organizations." To be sure, he is not opposed to such notions in principle. His concerns are that such international structures are not very international, that they do not reflect the will of many nations speaking together, but are dominated by the largest and richest nations. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, they have been dominated by the United States in particular, whose wealth and power, no longer checked by Soviet power, simply overwhelms the voice and influence of smaller, poorer countries. "Internationalism," Derrida points out, has a peculiar way of cooperating with "nationalism" (AC 49/OH 48). That is so in part because it presupposes the existence and sovereignty of the several member nations; in the "Roundtable," Derrida wonders whether a "new International" might actually get beyond nationality and national citizenship to something post-national, post-geographic. It is also true because such international associations have a way of ending up serving the interests of the most powerful member-nations, nations who set the international course. Indeed, such nations mask this power with meta-narratives that show them to have been chosen by History, or the Spirit, or Destiny, or Being to lead the way. One nation decides that its destiny is to set the course for Europe, and thereby for the world, so that the whole planet can become itself, that is, European, with Paris, London, or Berlin at the head of the fleet. That is what Derrida would have Europe avoid, and this by way of biting the bullet of the impossible. That means, on the one hand, learning to cultivate difference while avoiding both "dispersion" and "monopoly." As he says in the "Roundtable," either pure unity or pure multiplicity is a "synonym of death." Pure unity would be totalitarian, and pure multiplicity would be anarchistic; either way, a catastrophe. On the one hand, Europe needs to avoid dispersion because it is in constant danger of deteriorating into a myriad of nationalist idioms and self-enclosed idiolects, into a European "apartheid." 11 On the other hand, Europeans need to cultivate cooperation while avoiding "monopoly," a translation of their differences into a single overarching standardization which circulates across the lines of a transnational teletechnology. That would wipe out national difference by establishing a uniform grid of intelligibility, a trans-national cultural capital, a central switchboard, a central power, a capital that is not a particular city or metropolis. Such a world would be generically Euro-American or NATO-ese; it would speak American/English, the new lingua franca, and it would be driven by a European science that stretches from Copernicus, Galileo, and Isaac Newton to M.I.T. and Silicon Valley. For this world "politics" is perhaps no longer an adequate term; it would be rather a "quasi-politics" of the tele-techno-scientific world, the virtual world (AC 41-43/OH 38-40). To move ahead in the midst of such an aporia, to proceed where the way seems blocked, that is to "experience the impossible" (AC 43/ OH 41) to pass through, to travel through the aporia of impossibility (AC 46-47/OH 45-46). Only then is there a genuine "responsibility," which means the need to respond to a situation that has not been programmed in advance, to invent new gestures, to affirm an unstable identity that differs from itself. That impossibility is the only possible invention, the invention of the other: The condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention [AC 43/OH 41]. (2) The other capitalism is the one criticized by Marx and celebrated by the free market triumphalism of Francis Fukuyama, in which all the evils of capitalism, the vast disparity of rich and poor nations, of rich and poor people in the same nation, are swept under the rug of the march of the absolute spirit of economic freedom and the free market: [N]ever have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity [SdM 141/SoM 85]. All the blatant injustice and manifest suffering of such a world is treated as a temporary blip or empirical shortfall of the absolute progress of an Idea whose time has come, is indeed being fulfilled before our eyes as the Evil Empire comes crashing down. That argument, first broached here, is developed in greater detail in Specters of Marx. In the face of such suffering Derrida calls for a "new International," which does not mean an anachronistic revival of a worn-out Marxist idea, another try at an international association of workers with international headquarters somewhere. This international "community," which would barely deserve the name of "community" (SdM 148/SoM 90), would be forged from forces that have resisted Marxist dogma on the one hand but have been no less resistant to conservative and reactionary tendencies. The new International would form an ethical and moral coalition of all those who are, as he says in the "Roundtable, " "secretly aligned in their suffering against the hegemonic powers which protect what is called the 'new order.'" They would constitute a coalition

### Capitalism is not the root cause of sexism, racism, inequality, environmental destruction, or conflict, and fundamentalist ideologies like the alt actively prevent solutions.

Levin 98 – President of Yale Richard Levin, president of Yale, 1998, The Minnesota Review, 48-49, <http://www.theminnesotareview.org/journal/ns48/levin.htm>

As a result of this view of the world, many people on the far right and far left are single-causers; they believe not only that everything the demon does has bad effects in our society, but also that everything bad in our society is caused by this demon. Right-wing extremists hold feminism or secular humanism or ZOG responsible for drugs, crime, floridation, and the decline of "family values," and many leftists—including some appearing in mr—claim that capitalism is the cause of racism and sexism (Cotter 119-21, Lewis 97-98, Young 288-91). This, in turn, leads to the belief that there's a single cure, and only this one cure, for all these social ills: the complete extirpation of the demon that causes them and the complete transformation of society. Thus extremists on both sides tend to be all-or-nothingists, to reject all reforms as "band-aids" that are doomed to fail since they don't get at the source of our problems and so won't further this radical transformation (Neilson/Meyerson 45: 268-69). Many are also millenarians who believe the transformation will be brought about by an apocalyptic clash between the forces of good and evil ending in the permanent defeat of the demon and the creation of a utopia(for fundamentalists this is a literal Armageddon and Second Coming, for militias it's RaHoWa (Racial Holy War) or the uprising of true patriots against our traitorous government foretold in The Turner Diaries with its Hitlerian "final solution," and for Marxists it's the proletarian revolution that, their anthem tells us, will be "the final conflict." Another consequence of their polarization is that partisans at both extremes try to eliminate the intermediate positions between them, often by denying their differences. Neilson and Meyerson say that "we should see liberalism and conservatism as flipsides" (45: 269) and argue that Republicans and Democrats are really the same (47: 242), as does Tom Lewis at greater length (89-90). Similarly, George Wallace, in his racist, third-party campaign, insisted that "there isn't a dime's worth of difference between them." More sinister is their tendency to "disappear" these intermediate positions by equating them with the opposite extreme. McCarthy and his followers attacked Democrats and even liberal Republicans as "pinkos" and "fellow travelers," and Marxist regimes condemned social democrats and even communists who deviated from the party line as fascist counterrevolutionaries who must be liquidated. Some extremists on the academic left employ this tactic against moderates and liberals, although with less lethal results.

### The Plan in the Light of Justice and Democracy to Come Is A Strike Against Neoliberalism and Key to Create a New Vision of Citizenship That Overcomes

Brown 2003

(Wendy, political theorist at UC Berkeley, “Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy” Theory and Event 7:1)

What remains for the Left, then, is to challenge emerging neo-liberal governmentality in EuroAtlantic states with an alternative vision of the good, one that rejects homo oeconomicus as the norm of the human and rejects this norm's correlative formations of economy, society, state and (non)morality. In its barest form, this would be a vision in which justice would not center upon maximizing individual wealth or rights but on developing and enhancing the capacity of citizens to share power and hence, collaboratively govern themselves. In such an order, rights and elections would be the background rather than token of democracy, or better, rights would function to safeguard the individual against radical democratic enthusiasms but would not themselves signal the presence nor constitute the central principle of democracy. Instead a left vision of justice would focus on practices and institutions of shared popular power; a modestly egalitarian distribution of wealth and access to institutions; an incessant reckoning with all forms of power -- social, economic, political, and even psychic; a long view of the fragility and finitude of non-human nature; and the importance of both meaningful activity and hospitable dwellings to human flourishing. However differently others might place the accent marks, none of these values can be derived from neo-liberal rationality nor meet neo-liberal criteria for the good. The development and promulgation of such a counter rationality -- a different figuration of human beings, citizenship, economic life, and the political -- is critical both to the long labor of fashioning a more just future and to the immediate task of challenging the deadly policies of the imperial U.S. state.

Alignment with the New International through institution is the key to overcoming the mass extermination of neoliberalism

Derrida 94

Jacques Derrida was Director of Studies at the Ecole Pratique de Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris. *Specters of Marx,* 84-86.

These facts do not suffice to disqualify international institutions. Justice demands, on the contrary, that one pay tribute to certain of those who are working within them in the direction of the perfectibility and emancipation of institutions that must never be renounced. However insufficient, confused, or equivocal such signs may still be, we should salute what is heralded today in the reflection on the right of interference or intervention in the name of what is obscurely and sometimes hypocritically called the humanitarian, thereby limiting the sovereignty of the State in certain conditions. Let us salute such signs even as one remains vigilantly on guard against the manipulations or appropriations to which these novelties can be subjected. Let us return now to the immediate vicinity of the subject of our conference. My subtitle, "the New International," refers to a profound transformation, projected over a long term, of international law, of its concepts, and its field of intervention. Just as the concept of human rights has slowly been determined over the course of centuries through many socio-political upheavals (whether it be a matter of the right to work or economic rights, of the rights of women and children, and so forth), likewise international law should extend and diversify its field to include, if at least it is to be consistent with the idea of democracy and of human rights it proclaims, the worldwide economic and social field, beyond the sovereignty of States and of the phantom-States we mentioned a moment ago. Despite appearances, what we are saying here is not simply anti-statist: in given and limited conditions, the super-State, which might be an international institution, may always be able to limit the appropriations and the violence of certain private socio-economic forces. But without necessarily subscribing to the whole Marxist discourse (which, moreover, is complex, evolving, heterogeneous) on the State and its appropriation by a dominant class, on the distinction between State power and State apparatus, on the end of the political. on "the end of politics," or on the withering away of the State,5 and, on the other hand, without suspecting the juridical idea in itself, one may still find inspiration in the Marxist "spirit" to criticize the presumed autonomy of the juridical and to denounce endlessly the de facto take-over of international authorities by powerful Nation-States, by concentrations of techno-scientific capital, symbolic capital, and financial capital, of State capital and private capital. A "new international" is being sought through these crises of international law; it already denounces the limits of a discourse on human rights that will remain inadequate, sometimes hypocritical, and in any case formalistic and inconsistent with itself as long as the law of the market, the "foreign debt," the inequality of technoscientific, military, and economic development maintain an effective inequality as monstrous as that which prevails today, to a greater extent than ever in the history of humanity. For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neoevangelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itself as the ideal of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and humanity Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the "end of ideologies" and the end of the great emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, never have so many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth. (And proviSionally, but with regret, we must leave aside here the nevertheless indissociable question of what is becoming of so-called "animal" life, the life and existence of "animals" in this history. This question has always been a serious one, but it will become massively unavoidable.) The "New International" is not only that which is seeking a new international law through these crimes. It is a link of affinity, suffering, and hope, a still discreet, almost secret link, as it was around 1848, but more and more visible, we have more than one sign of it. It is an untimely link, without status, without tide, and without name, barely public even if it is not clandestine, without contract, "out of joint," without coordination, without party, without country, without national community (International before, across, and beyond any national determination), without co-citizenship, without common belonging to a class. The name of new International is given here to what calls to the friendship of an alliance without institution among those who, even if they no longer believe or never believed in the socialist-Marxist International, in the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the messiano-eschatological role of the universal union of the proletarians of all lands, continue to be inspired by at least one of the spirits of Marx or of Marxism (they now know that there is more than one) and in order to ally themselves, in a new, concrete, and real way, even if this alliance no longer takes the form of a party or of a workers' international, but rather of a kind of counter-conjuration, in the (theoretical and practical) critique of the state of internationali law, the concepts of State and nation, and so forth: in order to renew this critique, and especially to radicalize it.

**It is necessary to constantly create new, updated rules while working within institution. The alternative attempts to wish violence away, but that violence is inevitable. A TRC creates a tension between preserving memories through documentation, and the creation of something absolutely new.**

**Derrida 94**(in “Deconstruction in a Nutshell by John Caputo, written in 1997”)

What is called "deconstruction"--and I will be very sketchy here, because time does not permit detailed analyses--has never, never opposed institutions as such, philosophy as such, discipline as such. Nevertheless, as you rightly said, it is another thing for me to be doing what I am doing here. Because, however affirmative deconstruction is, it is affirmative in a way that is not simply positive, not simply conservative, not simply a way of repeating the given institution. I think that the life of an institution implies that we are able to criticize, to transform, to open the institution to its own future. The paradox in the instituting moment of an institution is that, at the same time that it starts something new, it also continues something, is true to the memory of the past, to a heritage, to something we receive from the past, from our predecessors, from the culture. If an institution is to be an institution, it must to some extent break with the past, keep the memory of the past, while inaugurating something absolutely new [cf. PdS139/ Points130-131]. So, I am convinced that today, although this program to some extent looks like other, similar programs, it does something absolutely new. The indication of this is found not simply in the structural organization of the program, but in the work, in the content of the work, of those who will run this program, the new themes. The fact, for instance, that the faculty includes such topics as Heidegger or deconstruction indicates that they are not simply reproducing, that they are trying to open something new and something original, something that hasn't been done in that way in other, similar universities or programs. So the paradox is that the instituting moment in an institution is violent in a way, violent because it has no guarantee. Although it follows the premises of the past, it starts something absolutely new, and this newness, this novelty, is a risk, is something that has to be risky, and it is violent because it is guaranteed by no previous rules. So, at the same time, you have to follow the rule and to invent a new rule, a new norm, a new criterion, a new law [cf. FL 50-52/ DPJ23]. That's why the moment of institution is so dangerous at the same time. One should not have an absolute guarantee, an absolute norm; we have to invent the rules. I am sure that the responsibility that is taken by my colleagues, and by the students, implies that they give themselves the new rule. There is no responsibility, no decision, without this inauguration, this absolute break. That is what deconstruction is made of: not the mixture but the tension between memory, fidelity, the preservation of something that has been given to us, and, at the same time, heterogeneity, something absolutely new, and a break. The condition of this performative success, which is never guaranteed, is the alliance of these to newness.

1. Linda Martín Alcoff (Dept of Philo, Syracuse University) “The Problem with Speaking for Others” *Cultural Critique* (Winter 91-92) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)